![]() ![]() In response, CrowdStrike tried again to set up a bug bounty disclosure meeting between ‘modzero's Sr Leadership’ and CrowdStrike CISO " to discuss next steps related to the bug bounty disclosure" in contrast to our previously stated disclosure rules,” a blog post by modzero says. “As the issue was not considered valid, we informed CrowdStrike that we would release the advisory to the public. The researchers initially tested one specific version of Falcon, but later in the process were able to get access to a newer version and found that the initial exploit they sent to CrowdStrike was flagged as malicious behavior and other countermeasures to the exploit had been included. The researchers declined both requirements, and after several months of back-and-forth discussions in which CrowdStrike told the researchers that the issue was not considered a valid security concern, modzero published the details of the flaw and a proof-of-concept exploit for it on Monday. CrowdStrike asked the researchers to report it through the company’s HackerOne bug bounty program and sign a non-disclosure agreement. Researchers at modzero, a Swiss research and services group, discovered the vulnerability and notified CrowdStrike in June. “Exploiting this vulnerability allows an attacker with administrative privileges to bypass the token check on Windows end-devices and to uninstall the sensor from the device without proper authorization, effectively removing the device's EDR and AV protection.” It prevents the uninstallation of CrowdStrike Falcon sensor on the end-device without a one-time generated token,” the advisory from researchers at modzero says. ![]() “The sensor can be configured with a uninstall protection. There is a thriving underground market for valid user and admin credentials and cybercrime groups and ransomware gangs often purchase access to corporate networks from initial access brokers who steal or buy credentials. ![]() In order to exploit the flaw, however, an attacker would first need to have administrator privileges on the machine, which is a significant hurdle, but not an impossible one to clear. The bug affects at least two versions of the Falcon agent, versions 5.0 and 0, and an attacker who can successfully exploit it would be able to remove the Falcon anti-malware and EDR agent from a target computer. Please refer to the documentation for Ansible's changelog fragments to learn more.UPDATE-Researchers have identified a vulnerability in CrowdStrike’s Falcon cloud-based endpoint protection system that enables a privileged user to bypass an important feature and uninstall the Falcon agent from any machine. This will require a changelog fragment to any PR that is not documentation or trivial. If you want to develop new content or improve on this collection, please open an issue or create a pull request.Īs of release > 3.2.18, we will now be following Ansible's development patterns for implementing Ansible's changelog fragments. More information on Ansible and Ansible Collections # falcon_cid is autodetected using falcon_client_id|secret vars falcon_tags: 'falcon,example,tags ' Installing on MacOSĪpple platforms require Mobile Device Management (MDM) software to install kernel extensions without user prompting.Īnsible is only able to run on macOS in an interactive session, which means end-users will receive prompts to accept the CrowdStrike kernel modules. Falcon_client_id: falcon_client_secret: roles: ![]()
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